Abstract
Critical doxography that presents and refutes Eleatic and sophistic theses: the eternal, infinite One of Melissus, the theological monism of Xenophanes, and the ontological nihilism of Gorgias (‘nothing exists; if it existed it could not be known; if known, it could not be communicated’).
Traduzione di W. S. Hett · Delphi Classics, 2013 · pubblico dominio
THE Greek text of Bekker is largely untranslatable. Apelt, by a careful recension of a manuscript not used by Bekker, has cleared up a great many obscurities, and by the kindness of Messrs. Teubner this text has been used for the translation in this volume. The notes of Professor J. Cook Wilson in the Classical Review (Vol. VI) have also been consulted, and a few alterations made in Apelt’s text in accordance with them. The difficulties of the manuscript may be gathered from a comment of a scribe who copied out one of them.
“The original is too mutilated, so no one need blame me. As I see, so have I written.” Even the title in Bekker’s text is wrong.
MELISSUS maintains that if anything exists it must be eternal, on the ground that it is impossible for anything to come into existence from nothing. (1) Whether everything has come into existence or only some things, they are in either case eternal; otherwise they would have come into existence from nothing. For if we suppose that everything has come into existence, then nothing existed beforehand; supposing, on the other hand, that some things existed, and that others were added thereto, then the body of existence would have grown more and larger. And its increment would have come into existence from nothing; for the more cannot exist in the less, nor the greater in the smaller. (2) But anything eternal must be infinite, because it has not a beginning from which its existence arose, nor any end into which it could ever terminate (for it is universal). (3) Again, anything eternal must be a unity. For if it were two or more, these would terminate in each other. (4) One again must be in every way homogeneous; for if it were not homogeneous, being plural, it could not be a unity, but would be many. (5) The eternal, then, being infinite and homogeneous in every way, the unity must be immovable. For it could not move unless it passed into something. In that case it must pass either into what is full or into what is empty. Of these two what is full cannot receive it, and what is empty has no existence. (6) This being the nature of what exists the unity is insensible to pain and sorrow, but is healthy and free from disease, neither showing any alteration in position nor betraying any change in form, nor any mixture with anything else. For in any of these cases the unity would become plural, the non-existent would be born, and that which does exist would be destroyed. And this is impossible. For if we were to say that the unity could be a mixture of many things, and that many things could move into each other, then the mixture would be either a kind of composition of many things in one, or by a different change there would be a laying of each ingredient on another; in the former case the elements mixed would be obviously separate, and in the latter each layer would become apparent by rubbing, as the first layers put under one another were removed; neither of which things happens in fact. In these ways only they could be many and could appear to us as they actually are. So that since this is impossible, what exists cannot be multiple, and to suppose so is an error. As many other things which appear true by sense. But this does not do away with the argument that things which exist come into existence, that what is one is not multiple, and that this is infinite and in every way homogeneous.
In the first place, one must not begin by adopting any opinion, but only those which have the soundest foundations. So that if all apparent truths are not correctly assumed, perhaps we have no right to subscribe to this theory, that nothing can arise out of nothing. For this opinion may also be one of the incorrect, which all of us assume from perception in many cases. But if all appearances are not false, but some of them are correct suppositions, either pointing to the real opinion which is, or at any rate to those which appear most correct, we must assume these; and these must always be regarded as more sure than those which are to be demonstrated from arguments of the other kind. For if there were two contradictory opinions, as he thinks (for he says that if there are many things, coming into existence must take place from what does not exist; but if this is impossible, then the things existing cannot be plural; for, as it does not come into existence, that which is must be infinite; but if this is so it is also a unity), in the same way if we admit both contentions, there is not more proof that it is one than that it is many. But if the one is better substantiated, then the conclusions arising from it are better proven. We chance then to be confronted with two propositions — (a) that nothing can come into existence from nothing, and (6) that what exists is plural and moving — and of the two the latter is more credible; everyone would rather reject the former view than the latter. If, then, it is true that the statements are contradictory, and that “growing out of the non-existent,” and “the present existence of many things” cannot both be true, then these views would be refuted by each other. But why should this be the case? Perhaps one could state a thesis that contradicts these. For Melissus has not proved anything by showing that the premiss from which he starts is correct, nor any more certain than that concerning which he is arguing. For it may be regarded as more probable that something should arise from nothing than that many things should not exist. In fact it is very commonly said that things which do not exist do come into existence, and that many things arise from what does not exist; and this is the opinion not merely of chance persons, but some men with reputations, as philosophers have said it too. So Hesiod says “first of all there was created Chaos, then the broad-bosomed earth, ever the safe foundation of all things, and then Love which belongs to all the Immortals.” All the rest of the universe he says grew out of these, but these out of nothing. Many others, again, say that nothing exists but everything is becoming, stating that what is becoming does not arise from what exists. For in that case everything would not come into existence. So that this is clear, that some at any rate believe that things come into existence from what does not exist.
But shall we now leave the question whether his conclusions are possible or impossible? It is now proper to inquire whether his conclusions follow from his premisses, or whether there is anything to prevent others being drawn; perhaps this is really a different question to the other. Admitting his first assumption that nothing can come into existence from what does not exist, does it follow that everything has not come into existence? Or is there anything to prevent one thing arising out of another, and this from being an infinite process? Or they might travel in a circle, so that each one arose out of the next, something always existing and each arising from each in an endless series. So there is nothing to prevent all things from having come into existence, even assuming that nothing can arise from what does not exist. None of the terms attached to unity prevents us from applying the term infinite to the existent. For it is said, and he himself attaches to the infinite the fact that it is equivalent to all. Also, even if things existing are not infinite there is nothing to prevent their birth taking place in a circle. Again, if everything is in a state of becoming and nothing exists, as some say, how could they be eternal? But he speaks of existence as something real and admitted. For he says, if a thing has not come into existence, but yet exists, it must be eternal on the assumption that existence is inherent in things. Furthermore supposing that it is impossible for what does not exist to come into being, and for what exists to be destroyed, all the same what is there to prevent some things from coming into being and existing and others from being eternal, as Empedocles himself really admits? For he has in reality admitted all these things himself when he says that, “It is impossible that anything can come into being from what does not exist, and incredible and unworkable that what exists should be destroyed, for it will ever be in the place where someone has fixed it”; yet at the same time he says that some existing things are eternal, fire, water, earth and air, and that all else arises and has arisen from these; for he says there is no other possible birth for things that exist, “other than mixture and interchange of the parts mixed; this is what men call natural process.” He states that for the eternal and the existent there is no process of developing into existence, since he believes this impossible. For he says; “How could anything increase the sum total, and whence could it come?” But the many, he thinks, comes into being by the mixing and putting together of fire with the elements combined with fire, and by their parting and separation they are destroyed again, and that the many exist by mixture and by separation, but that in nature there are only four elements apart from the causes, or else only one. If then, the elements by whose composition creation takes place, and by whose separation destruction ensues, are entirely infinite, as some allege that Anaxagoras says, what comes into existence would do so from what is always existent and is infinite, and thus all this would not be eternal, but some becoming and having become from what is, and being destroyed into other forms. Again, there is nothing to prevent the sum total of existence from being one form, as Anaximander and Anaximenes say, the former stating that the whole is water, and Anaximenes that it is air, and all the other philosophers who have maintained that the whole is one, and that this appears under varying forms, and in different degrees of number and size, and differs by its rarity and density, both what exists and what is coming into existence being many and infinite, and producing the whole. Now Democritus maintains that water, and air, and each of the many being essentially the same only differ in rhythm. What, then, is there to prevent the many from coming into existence and being destroyed in this way, what exists continually changing into what exists by the aforesaid differences in the one, and the sum total never becoming either more or less? Again, what is there to prevent bodies coming into existence from other bodies and again being resolved into bodies, and in this way by being dissolved coming into existence and being destroyed again in equal balance? But if one can agree to this and a thing might exist and yet never be born, why should it be further proved infinite? For he says that it is infinite if it exists and has not come into being. This he states on the ground that the beginning and the end of becoming are limits. And vet what is there in the previous argument to prevent a thing which has not come into existence from having a limit? For he claims that, if it has come into existence, it has as a beginning that from which it began to come into existence. What then, is there to prevent this having a beginning, even if it has not come into existence? Not of course, that from which they came into existence but another, and from their all having limits in relation to each other supposing that they are infinite? Again, what is there to prevent the sum total from being infinite because it has not come into existence, and the things which become in this sum total from being limited, seeing that they have the beginning and end of becoming? Again, as Parmenides says, what is there to prevent the sum total, even if it is one, and does not come into existence, from being limited, and from being “everywhere like unto the mass of a well-shaped sphere, each point on the circumference being equidistant from the centre for no measurement may be longer or shorter either in one direction or in another.” Seeing that it has a centre and extremes, it has a limit, although it has not come into existence. Again, being infinite if, as he says, the whole is one, and is a body, it has different parts of itself, but all its parts are like each other (for he declares the whole to be alike in this sense, not as one thing to another, which, you see, proves it limited, if the infinite is alike — for its likeness is like another, so that being two or more it could not be one or infinite — but perhaps he means like itself, and that the whole is alike in the sense that its parts are alike, all being water or earth or something else; for it is clear that he believes it one), but each of the parts being a body is not infinite (for the whole is infinite), so that these have a limit in relation to each other, without coming into existence. Further, if it is eternal and infinite, how could it be one, seeing that it is a body? For if its parts were unlike, he himself would admit that it was many. But if it is all water or all earth, or whatever it may be, it would have many parts, as even Zeno undertakes to prove that what is thus existent is one. Then its parts would be more than one, some being less than others and some smaller, so that it would be in every way different from one with no body either added or subtracted. But if it is not a body, and has neither breadth nor length, how could it be infinite? What, then, is there to prevent such things from being many and countless? What is to prevent their being infinite in size, even if they are more than one? As also Xenophanes says that the depth of the earth and the air are unlimited. So also does Empedocles prove this; for he criticizes the view, saying it is impossible if they are thus, as some people say, that they should ever come together. “If the depths of the earth are unlimited and the air is vast, like the things which pour vainly out from the mouths of men, they have but little conception of the whole.” Again, supposing it is one, there is nothing surprising in its not being alike in every part. For if it is all water, or fire, or whatever else it may be, there is nothing to prevent there being several forms of the one existence, though each is similar to each by itself. There is nothing to prevent part being rare and part dense, as long as there is no empty space in the rare; for in the rare there is no empty space isolated among its parts, so that of the whole part is dense and part empty (that which is rare is consistently so all through), but, the whole thing being alike full, the rare part is less full than the dense. But if it is also unborn, and for this reason would be admitted to be infinite, and that it is impossible for one thing to be infinite as well as another, and on this account it is necessary to attach the term one to it, again it is impossible; for how could it be unmoved, if it is quite impossible for a void to exist? For everything moves by changing its place. Now first of all everyone does not agree to this, but some think that there is an empty space, not that this is a body, but such as Hesiod describes Chaos to have been in the beginning, on the ground that there must be a space for existing things, and that this is empty like a vessel we are looking for in the centre. How, he argues, if there were no empty space could anything move? Since Anaxagoras, who concentrated on this problem, found himself content to demonstrate that there is no such thing, and yet believes that existing things move, even though there is no empty space. In the same way too Empedocles says that all existing things are continually moving while fusing together, but does not believe that there is an empty space, saying, “There is nothing entirely empty. Whence, then, could anything come into it?” But when things are collected into one form so as to become a unity, there is nothing, he says, either empty or overflowing. For what is to prevent their being carried into each other’s place and moving from one spot to another, and from this to a third, and then with another change back to the first and so on continually? Moreover, with the change of form which takes place in a thing remaining in the same spot, which others as well as he call change of state, there is nothing from what has been said to prevent things from being moved, when a change takes place from white to black or from bitter to sweet. For the nonexistence of an empty space or the fact that a full one can admit nothing else does not prevent a change of state. So that it is not essential that either everything should be eternal, or that the one should be infinite, but many are infinite. Nor is the one either homogeneous or immovable, neither if there is only one, nor if there is many. But when once this is admitted, there is nothing in his statements to prevent what exists from changing and becoming different; if what is existent is one, and movement belongs to the whole of it, and its differences are only quantitative, and a body changes its state without anything added or subtracted, and if the many is produced by union and separation among each other. This mixture is not likely to be a question of addition or of union of the kind Melissus mentions, in which the parts would be immediately separable, or in layers so that by rubbing off one the second would be seen to be different, but it is more probable that the union is arranged in such a way that one part of the mixture becomes actually part of that with which it is mixed, so that the parts will not be found lying side by side, one by another, but actually fused together. Since, therefore, no one body can be called smallest, each single part is fused with each other part, just as the whole is fused together.
XENOPHANES says that, if anything exists, it cannot have become, and he applies his conclusions to God. For that which has come into existence must have risen either from like or from unlike. But neither of these is possible. For it is neither natural that like should be begotten by like, any more than that like should beget like (for the same features occur in all equal quantities and their interrelations are similar), nor is it possible that unlike has come into existence from unlike. For he argues that if the stronger could arise from the weaker or the greater from the less, or conversely the inferior from the better, the nonexistent would arise from the existent, or conversely the existent from the non-existent; both of which are impossible. On these grounds then he claims that God must be eternal. Further, he says that if God is the most powerful of all, He must be one. For if there were two or more gods, He would no longer be the most powerful and best of them all. For each of the many being a god would also share His characteristics. For the essence of God and of His power is to rule and not to be ruled, and to be the most powerful of all. In so far then as He is not most powerful He is not God. But supposing that there are many gods in some respects more powerful than each other, and in other respects less so, they would not be gods; for it is the essential nature of God not to be subject to any control. Supposing that there were equal gods none of them would have the nature of gods; for God by nature must be most powerful of all; but that which is equal is neither better nor worse than that to which it is equal. If then God exists, and such is His character, God must be one alone. If this were not so, God could not do whatever He wished. He could not if there were more gods: therefore God must be one. But being one He must be similar in every direction, both having power to see and to hear and all the other senses in every part. For otherwise different parts of God would control and be controlled by each other; which is impossible. Again, Xenophanes says that being alike in all parts He must be spherical; for He cannot be of such a kind in one direction and not in another, but must be of that kind in every part. But being eternal, and one, and spherical He must be neither limited nor unlimited. For non-Being is unlimited; for this has neither middle, nor beginning, nor end, nor any other part, and this is the character of the unlimited. But Being cannot have the same character as non-Being. If they were more than one they would be limited by each other. But the one is in no way similar to non Being, or to the many; for the one has nothing in which it could reach a limit. Again the one, of the type which Xenophanes declares God to be, could neither move nor be immovable. For non-Being is immovable. For another thing cannot enter into its place, nor it into the place of another. It is only things more than one which move. For one thing must move into the place of another. But nothing could move into the place of the non-Being; for non-Being has no place. If, then, they could change places, the one would be more than one. Two, then, or more than one, could be moved, but what does not exist must be at rest and immovable. But the one can neither be at rest nor be moved; for it is similar neither to non-Being nor to the many. In all respects, then, God is of this kind, eternal and one, alike throughout and spherical, neither limited nor unlimited neither at rest nor movable.
Now to begin with Xenophanes assumes, as Melissus does, that what comes into existence arises from what is. Yet what is there to prevent what comes into existence arising neither from what is like nor from what is unlike, but from what is nonexistent? Again, God is no more unborn than everything else, even if everything has come into existence from what is like or from what is unlike; which is impossible. So that either there is nothing existing except God, or everything is eternal. Again, he assumes God to be strongest of all, when he calls Him most powerful and best. This is not the popular view, which is that the different gods are superior to each other in many ways. Xenophanes, then, did not take this as an admission from popular opinion. It is possible, then, that, in speaking of the pre-eminence of God, he means not that this is His nature in comparison with anything else, but only in comparison with His own disposition, since in relation to another there would be nothing to prevent His excelling not by His own excellence and strength, but by the weakness of others. But no one would wish to describe God as most powerful in this sense, but only because He is as good as it is possible to be, and in His excellence there is nothing lacking; this of course might be true of one who was His equal. There would be nothing to prevent a number from being so, all of them having the best possible disposition, and being superior to all others though not to each other. But, one would think, there are others besides God. For he says that God is most powerful, but this must necessarily be over something. Again, there is no need for God, because He is one, to see and hear in every part; for if He does not see with one part, He does not see worse with this part, but He does not see at all. But perhaps by perception in every part He means that the best possible condition would be if He were alike in every part. But, supposing this were His character, why should He be spherical, and not have rather some other shape, because He hears and has power in every part? Just in this way, when we say of white lead that it is entirely white, we mean nothing but that whiteness is a colour which dyes all parts of it; what, then, is there to prevent our meaning, when we say that hearing, seeing and power lie in every part, that whatever part one takes will always show this characteristic? In this case God need no more be spherical than white lead. Again, how is it possible that God should be neither limited nor unlimited, supposing that He is corporeal and has magnitude, since that is unlimited which has no limit, though it is capable of having such; and a limit is a characteristic of size and number and every quantity, so that if being a magnitude it has no limit, it may be called unlimited? But again, if spherical, it must have a limit. For a sphere has limits, since it has a centre, and these limits are the farthest points from the centre. It must have a centre, if it is spherical; for a definition of the spherical is that which has all its limits equidistant from the centre. It makes no difference whether we say that a body has extremes or limits. But if the non-existent is unlimited, why should not the existent also be unlimited? For what is there to prevent the same things being said of the existent and the non-existent? For no one can now see what does not exist, and one might not now see what does exist; both things can be both said and thought. But what does not exist cannot be white; I suppose, then, that on this account either all existing things are white, to prevent our attaching the same meaning to the existent and the nonexistent, or there is, I imagine, nothing to prevent anything that exists from being not white; and so they will readily allow another negative, namely, unlimited, if, as we have said before, “infinite” depends upon its having, or not having, a limit. So that being is either unlimited or else it has a limit. But perhaps it is absurd to attach absence of limit to what does not exist. For we do not call everything unlimited if it has not a limit, just as we could not call the not-equal unequal. Moreover, why should not God have a limit because He is one, but His limit would not be God. But if God is one only, then both God and His parts must be one only. Again, this too is absurd, that if it falls to the lot of many to have a limit in each other, on this account the one has no limit. For many of the same qualities belong to the many and to the one, since existence is common to both of them. It would be unreasonable if we were to say on this account that there is no God, because the many exist, and He cannot therefore resemble the many in this way. Again, what is there to prevent God from being limited and having limits because He is one? So Parmenides says that being one He “is in every way like to the circle, all points in the circumference being equidistant from the centre.” For presumably the limit of everything must exist, but it need not end in anything, nor need what has a limit have its limit in anything, as for instance when its limit is the unlimited next to it in series, but that which is limited must have extremities but need not have them ending in anything. Some things may have both qualities, that is, are limited and impinge on something else, but others may be limited but not be limited by anything else. Again, on the question of being and not being unmoved, on the ground that what is non-existent does not move, perhaps it is just as absurd as the former. Again, no one would suppose that not being moved and being unmoved were the same thing; not being moved is merely a negation of moving (just as not-equal is a negation of equal), which can truthfully be predicated of the non-existent, but unmoved is the attribution of a certain positive quality, like unequal, and implies the opposite of being moved, namely keeping still, almost as the privative alpha makes words mean their opposites. Not being moved is a true description of the non-existent, but being at rest cannot be attributed to the non-existent. In the same way it cannot be unmoved, which means the same thing. But Xenophanes applies the term “at rest” to the non-existent, and says that the non-existent is at rest, because it admits no change of place. As we said above, it is absurd, if we attach any attribute to the non-existent, to say that therefore it cannot be applied with truth to the existent, especially if what is said is a mere negation, such as not-moving and not-changing position. For, as has been said, it would make it impossible to attribute many things to what exists. It would not even be true to say that the “many” is “not one”, since what does not exist is also “not one.”
Again, in some cases contraries seem to arise from the actual negations; for instance, one of the terms equal and unequal must apply, whether we are dealing with numbers or magnitudes, and odd and even must apply if we are dealing with numbers. Possibly in the same way the terms “at rest” or “in motion” must apply if we are dealing with a body.
Again, if God, or the one, does not move because the many move by passing into each other, what is there to prevent God from moving into another place? For he never claims that God is the only existent, but that only one God exists. If this is the case, what is there to prevent God from moving in a circle by His parts moving into each other? For he will surely not say, as Zeno does, that a one of this kind is really many. For he himself says that God is a body, whether this body is the “all” or whether he calls it something else. For if God were not corporeal, how could He be spherical?
Again, the only case in which God could neither be at rest nor moving would be if He existed nowhere. Since God is a body, what prevents that body from moving, as has been said?
GORGIAS maintains first, that nothing exists; secondly, that if anything exists it is unknowable; and thirdly, that if anything exists and is knowable, it cannot be demonstrated to others. To prove that nothing exists, he combines the statements made by different people, who in discussing the question of Being have apparently made contradictory assertions; some say that Being is one and not many, others that it is many and not one, some that it has never come into being, and others claim that it has; he attempts to draw his conclusions from both sides. For he says, if anything exists, it is either one or many, and either has not come into existence or it has. If, then, it happens that it is neither one nor many, neither born nor unborn, it would be nothing. If then, there were anything, it would be one of these two things. To prove that it is neither one nor many, neither unborn nor born, he tries to prove partly on the lines of Melissus and partly on those of Zeno, after the first demonstration of his own, in which he says that neither Being nor not-Being can exist. For if Not-Being is Not-Being. Not-Being IS no less than being. For Not-Being IS Not-being, and Being IS also Being, so that things exist no more than not exist. If Not-Being exists, then Being, which is its opposite, does not. For if Not-Being exists, then Being and Not-Being seem to be the same. On these grounds, he says, nothing could exist, unless Being and Not-Being are the same thing. And if they were the same thing, on these grounds too nothing would exist; for Not-Being does not exist, and the same applies to Being, since it is the same thing as Not-Being. This, then, is his argument.
Now it does not follow from any of his statements that nothing exists. His own demonstration is thus disproved. If Not-Being exists, either it exists in the ordinary sense of the term, or in the sense in which Not-Being does not exist. Now this is not apparent, nor is it a necessary conclusion; supposing, then, there are two things, one of which is, and one only seems to be, the one exists, but the other is not true, because it is non-existent. Why, then, should there be neither Being nor Not-Being? Both, and not only one, are possible. For he says Not-Being would exist no less than Being, if Not-Being had any existence, whence he states that Not-Being has no existence of any sort. But even if Not-Being IS Not-Being, Not-Being need not BE in the same sense as Being IS a; for the former simply is Not-Being, but the latter also exists. Even if it were possible to apply the word IS in its truest sense, how absurd it would be to say that Not-Being IS. And even if it were, would it be any more reasonable to say that everything IS not rather than IS? In this case the opposite seems to be true. For if Not-Being can be said to exist, and Being also exists, then all things exist, for both things which are and those which are not exist. For it does not follow that if Not-Being exists Being does not exist. If, then, anyone were to agree both that Not-Being exists, and that Being does not exist, even in this case something would exist; for according to his argument Not-Being would exist. If, then, Being and Not-Being are identical, in this case nothing can be said to exist any more than not to exist. For, as he himself says, if Not-Being and Being are identical, then neither Being nor Not-Being has any existence, so that nothing exists, and changing the argument round it is just as true to say that everything exists. For both Not-Being and Being exist, and therefore everything exists. After this argument Gorgias says that if anything exists it is either unborn or born. If it is unborn he maintains by the axioms of Melissus that it is infinite; and the infinite, he says, is nowhere. For it can neither be in itself nor in another: if it existed in another there would be two infinites, that which is in something and that in which it is: and according to Zeno’s discussion on Space, that which is no-thing must be no-where. For this reason, then, it is not unborn, nor can it be born. For nothing could be born either from Being or from Not-Being. For if it were born from Being, it would have changed, which is impossible; for if it were to change, it would no longer be Being, just as if Not-Being were to be born, it would no longer be Not-Being. Again it could not be born from Being, for if Not-Being does not exist, clearly nothing could be born out of nothing; but if Not-Being does exist, it could not be born from Not-Being, for the same reason as it could not be born from Being. If, then, it is inevitable, that if anything exists it is either unborn or born (and this is impossible), then it is impossible for anything to exist. Again, if anything exists, he says it must be either one or many; if it were neither one nor many, it could not exist. He says it cannot be one, because one is really not corporeal, as it has no magnitude: which is disproved by Zeno’s argument. If, then, it is not one, it could not exist at all. For if it is not one, it cannot be many. But, he argues, if it is neither one nor many, it does not exist at all. Again, he says that nothing can be moved. For if it were moved, it would not be the same as it was before, but Being would have become Not-Being, and Not-Being would be born. Again if it has any motion whereby it can change its place, not being continuous it suffers division, and at the point where Being is divided, it does not exist; so that if it moves in every part, it is divided in every part. If this is the case, it ceases to exist in any part. For it falls short of Being (so Gorgias says) at the point of its division, and he calls it division instead of Void, as it is described in the works ascribed to Leucippus.
“These, then, he claims as proofs that nothing exists; after this he states his proof that, if anything exists, it is unknowable. For if it could be known, then all subjects of thought must exist and Not-Being, since it does not exist, could not be thought of. But, if this is so, no one, he says, could say anything false, not even if he said that chariots compete in the sea. For everything would be in the same category. So things seen and things heard will exist, because each of them is an object of thought; if this is not the case, if, that is, what we see no more exists because we see it, so what we think no more exists because we think of it (for just as in that case many would see this, and in the other many would think of it), why should it be any more clear, if such things exist? But it is quite uncertain which kind of things is true. So that, if they exist, things must in any case be unknown by us. But even if they are known, how, he says, could anyone communicate them to another? For how could a man express in words what he has seen? Or how could a thing be clear to a man who heard it, if he has not seen it? For just as sight is not the sense which recognizes sounds, so hearing cannot hear colours, but only sounds; and the speaker speaks, but he does not speak a colour or a thing. Anything, then, which a man has not in his own consciousness, how can he acquire it from the word of another, or by any sign which is different from the thing, except by seeing it if it is a colour, or hearing it if it is a sound? For, to begin with, no one speaks a sound or a colour, but only a word; so that it is not possible to think a colour but only to see it, nor to think a sound, but only to hear it. Granting, then, that it is possible to know and read a word, how can the hearer be conscious of the same thing? For it is impossible for the same thing to exist in several separate persons; for then the one would be two. But if the same things were in several persons, there is nothing to prevent it from not being the same in them all, seeing that they are not in every way alike, nor in the same place; for if anything were this, it would be one and not two. But even the man himself does not seem to perceive similar things at the same time, but different things with his hearing and with his vision, and different again at the moment and long ago, so that one man can hardly perceive the same things as another. Thus if anything exists, it cannot be known, and if it is known, no one could show it to another; because things are not words, and because no one thinks the same things as another.
All philosophers including Gorgias are here dealing with difficulties of other older thinkers, so that in consideration of their views these must also be examined.