Abstract
Short fragments on eloquence and style: eloquence as a portraiture of thought, the correspondence between speaker and hearer, the demand for simplicity and nature, and the condemnation of false beauties and ornamental antitheses.
Traduzione di George Pearce · Delphi Classics, 2000 · pubblico dominio
We require from a speaker both agreeableness and truth; but that which aims to be agreeable, must be based upon truth.
— Princes and kings must sometimes unbend. To be ever on their thrones would be insufferable; greatness needs occasional relaxation from its dignities, that they may be the better appreciated.
— + Too much continuity displeases in all things. Cold is agreeable, and makes us enjoy warmth.
III. Eloquence is a portraiture of the thought; those, therefore, who overload with colour, produce a painting indeed, but not a portrait.
IV. Eloquence is the art of expressing things in such a manner, that, — first, the persons addressed shall listen not only without uneasiness, but with satisfaction; and, secondly, they shall feel an interest in the subjects discussed, and shall accompany them with beneficial reflections.
It consists, then, in a correspondence aimed at, on the one hand, between the mind of the writer or speaker, and the feelings of those addressed; and, on the other, between the thoughts as they arise in the mind, and the language which is made their vehicle; all which supposes a profound study of the heart of man, to acquire a knowledge of its most secret springs, and to draw out the desired emotions by appropriate language. We ought to put ourselves in the place of those whom we address, and to make trial upon our own heart of any touching or forcible turn of discourse; in order to ascertain whether the one is calculated to affect the other; and thus be assured, of carrying with us the sympathies of the hearer. We ought, as much as possible, to study simplicity and nature; and to give no undue elevation to what is, in itself, low, nor to lower what is great. It is not enough that a thought or an illustration be intrinsically beautiful; it must be appropriate to our subject, in which nothing ought to be excessive, and nothing deficient. [This definition of eloquence is undoubtedly worthy of the author of the “Provincials,” and bears with it its own evidences of authenticity. But it is not found in the MS. nor the copies; Bossut first published it, without stating whence it was derived.]
V. In every conversation, or discourse, we ought to be able to answer, if objection be taken, “What is it you complain of?”
VI. There are some who speak well, but write indifferently. The reason is, that occasion and circumstances produce an excitement, and draw from the mind more than would be elicited without such assistances. [Montaigne, Book ii., chap. 17. .. “I owe it to accident that I can talk more effectively than I write; movement and action give animation to speech.”]
Those who use antitheses to give effect to words, are like builders that put false windows in their houses, for the sake of symmetry.
Their rule is, not to speak accurately, but to produce exact figures.
We must not turn our minds aside from their purpose, except for relaxation, and then only on suitable occasions: you may trifle when necessary, but not otherwise; if unseasonably, you will cause weariness. Whoever descends to trifling at unfitting times, will produce dissatisfaction; for such is the capriciousness of the fancy, that our feelings are apt to recoil upon themselves, and take the very opposite to the desired course, when we cease to experience pleasure: this latter is the coin for which we yield all that is asked of us.
IX. When we meet with a really natural style of composition, we are surprised and delighted; we looked for an author, and we find a man. On the other hand, persons of good taste, expecting in a book to find a man, are often surprised to meet with only an author: “plus poetice quam humane locutus es” Those do real honour to nature, who show that she can treat of all subjects, not even excepting Theology.
X. If the lightning had fallen upon a low country, &c., poets, and others who can only reason upon things of that nature, would have failed of their illustrations.
XI. We put a mask on nature, and disguise her. We must not talk of a king, a pope, a bishop, but an “ august Monarch,” &c.; — not of Paris, but of “the capital of the realm.”
There are some occasions when we should call Paris, Paris; others, on the contrary, when it may be called “the capital of the realm.”
XII. When we meet with repetitions of words in a composition, and, on endeavouring to correct them, we find their removal would impair the effect, we should leave them: to do otherwise shows a blind fastidiousness which is unable to perceive that, in such a case, a repetition is no defect; this is one of those points, however, which admit of no general rule. [On the reverse of the paper on which this remark is written, are the following lines struck through:—”.When I was a child, I locked up my book; and because it sometimes happened that I deceived myself in thinking I had locked it up, I became distrustful of myself…]
XIII. The meaning of a passage will be changed by the words made use of in its expression. Meanings receive from, rather than impart to words their force. To find examples of this…
XIV. The last thing we do in composing a work, is to determine upon the mode of its commencement.
XV. Those accustomed to judge by feeling, understand little of reasoning; they decide by a glance, and are not able to search into principles. Others, on the contrary, who are in the habit of reasoning from principles, cannot enter into matters of feeling; principles are all they look for, and they can do nothing by mere sight.
XVI. When we are acquainted with a person’s ruling passion, we are sure to be able to please him; and yet every one has some fancies opposed to his real welfare, which he supposes contribute to it; this is a capriciousness which throws us off our scent.
XVII. When a description true to nature is given of a passion, or an incident, we feel an internal conviction of its fidelity, although we had before been unconscious of it; and thus experience a feeling of complacency towards the narrator. For he does not so much describe what is in himself, as what is reflected in our own minds, and this gives us satisfaction; besides that the sympathy thus formed between us and him inclines us the more to good-will towards him.
XVIII. + It is not in Montagne [We here retain Pascal’s orthography: he always writes Montagne, instead of Montaigne.], but in myself, that I see everything I find in him.
Montague’s defects are great. Lasciviousness, — a vile quality, in spite of Mademoiselle de Gournay. Credulity, “people without eyes;’ ignorance, “quadrature of the circle, a larger world” His sentiments on voluntary homicide and death; he induces an indifference respecting our salvation; “without fear, and without repentance.” As his work does not profess to be religious, he is not bound to inculcate piety; but none are absolved from the obligation not to deter from its observances. We might excuse his free and voluptuous sentiments, under some circumstances of life; [In the margin are written, Nos. 730 and 231, which no doubt refer to the pages in Pascal’s edition of the “Essays.”] but we cannot excuse his heathenish views of death; for we must renounce every feeling of religion, not to desire to die as a Christian: while his aim throughout his whole book is to teach men how to hold life loosely, and quit it with ease.
XX. What is good in Montagne must have been of difficult acquirement. What is bad (I mean apart from his morals) might have been corrected with ease; he should have had a hint that he tells too many stories, and talks too much of himself.
XXI. When we cannot attain to truth, it is as well that there should be extant some common and prevalent error, which gives a degree of stability to the mind; such as attributing changes of season, the progress of diseases, &c., to the moon. For the chief evil of man is a restless curiosity into things, of which he cannot acquire a knowledge; and error is less injurious than this fruitless curiosity.
- The mode of writing most usual with Epictetus, Montagne, and Salomon de Tultie, is that which impresses the most, dwells longest in the memory, and is most apt for quotation; inasmuch as it consists of thoughts thrown out from the ordinary occurrences of life. Thus, when reference is made to the vulgar error — that the moon has an effect upon everything, we are always reminded of Salomon de Tultie’s remark, “ When truth cannot be discovered, it is well that there should be some universal error,” &c.; which is the thought adduced above.
Man is prone to malignity; yet it is not directed against the unhappy, but against the proud and happy: to suppose the contrary is a mistake.
- For concupiscence is the source of all our agitations; and humanity…
— + We should endeavour to please persons of humane and tender dispositions.
— That on “the two one-eyed persons” is good for nothing; it affords them no consolation, and is only a vain conceit of the author. Whatever exhibits only an author’s skill is worthless. “Ambitiosa recidet orna-menta.”
XXIV. + The same words, differently arranged, will convey a different meaning; and meanings differently arranged, produce different results.
XXV. Let no one say, I have said nothing new: the arrangement of the materials is new. When two persons are playing at tennis, they use the same ball; but one strikes it better than the other.
In the same way, I should wish always to be told that I make use of common words; and, if the same thoughts have not formed altogether another subject by a different arrangement, the same words will have formed other thoughts by their different disposition.
XXVI. Some authors, speaking of their works, say “my book, my commentary, my history,” &c. They are like ill-bred persons who have just got a house of their own, and are always talking of “my house” They would do better to say “our book, our commentary, our history,” &c.; for there is usually more that belongs to others in them than to themselves. [This passage, which is highly characteristic of Pascal, is not found either in the MS. or the copies, or any other MSS. that have been consulted. It was published first by Bossut, but without stating where it had been found.]
XXVII. Languages are a species of cipher, in which it is not letters that are changed into letters, but words into words; so that an unknown tongue is decipherable.
XXVIII. There is a kind of standard of agreeableness and beauty, which consists in a certain relation between our natural dispositions, whether it be feeble or strong, and that which gives us pleasure.
Whatever conforms to this standard pleases; be it a residence, music, discourse, poetry, prose, females, birds, rivers, trees, chambers, dress, &c.
Whatever is not adapted to this model displeases those who have a susceptibility of taste.
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And as there is a perfect relation between a piece of music and a house formed upon a good model, because they resemble such model, although each in its respective fashion; so there is a perfect relation between things formed upon a bad model. Not that there is only one bad model; for there are in reality an infinite number. But take the case of a sonnet; and you will find it, when composed upon a bad model whatever it be, like a female dressed in this kind of ill taste.
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Nothing shows more plainly the absurdity of this vicious kind of poetry, than to contrast it with the simplicity of nature, and then suppose a female dressed, or a house constructed, after such a fashion.
If we are to have a poetical beauty, we ought also to have a geometrical beauty, and a medicinal beauty. Yet we do not speak thus; and the reason is, that we well know the object of geometry, — that it is to work out demonstrations; and the object of medicine, — that it is the healing of sickness; but we do not know in what consists that satisfaction which is the object of poetry. We do not know what is the model in nature which it seeks to imitate; and, for want of that knowledge, certain affected phrases have been invented, such as “golden age,”
“miracle of the day,”
“fatality,” &c.; and this jargon is called poetical beauty!
But carry your thoughts to the case of a female dressed after such a fashion as this, — this endeavour to express petty sentiments with tumid words, — and you will imagine a beauty decked out with beads, chains, and other tawdry ornaments. You would laugh, for you know what constitutes the real grace of women, better than you understand the pleasure aimed at by versification: but those who do not know this would be filled with admiration at all this finery; and there are many country places where such a damsel would be taken for a queen! Thus it is that we should call poems composed after this fashion, village queens.
XXX. + I have never been able to form, after an interval, exactly the same judgment respecting the same things. I cannot judge of a work that I am engaged in, while composing it: I must, like the painters, look at it from a distance, but not too great a one. How great should it be, then? Consider.
XXXI. Those who judge of a work without being possessed of rules, are, in reference to others, like persons comparing time with their watches. One says, “We have been two hours another, “We have been only three-quarters of an hour.” I look at my watch; I say to the one, “You are tired,” and to the other, “Time passes quickly with you, for you have been an hour and a half.” Thus I laugh at those who say time passes heavily with me, and that I judge by mere guess: they do not know that I decide by my watch.
XXXII. We do not get credit among people in general for a knowledge of versification, unless we bear about with us the air of the poet: and the same is the case with mathematicians, &c. Persons of genius, however, carry no such external indications; but exhibit no difference between the occupation of the poet, and that of the embroiderer.
Persons of genius are not called poets, geometricians, &c; but they are all these, and know how to judge of all these things. You do not at first find them out. When they join you, they slide into the passing topics of conversation. You perceive in them no distinctive feature of mind, except when occasion arises to call it into exercise; then, however, they make themselves felt. It is the characteristic of such persons, that you never remark anything peculiar in their conversation, when the subjects are not of a literary nature; but when they are such, then you perceive their superiority.
It is, therefore, an ill compliment to say of a man on his coming into company, that he exhibits the poet; and it is equally so, if you only appeal to such a person, when the question turns upon the merits of a few verses. [“Et c’est une mauvaise marque, quand on n’a pas recours à un homme, quand il s’agit de juger de quelques vers.” The rendering here given to this clause, requires the insertion of the limiting particle que before the quand; and as this seems the obvious meaning of the passage, the word in question must, I think, have been omitted in the MS. (Transl.)]
XXXIII. + I prefer not to say of any one, he is a mathematician, or a preacher, or an eloquent man; but that he is “honnête homme” This is a universal designation, and is the only one that pleases me. It is a had thing when you only think of a man’s hook, on first seeing him; and I would rather that nothing remarkable were perceived in him, except when a proper occasion, should occur for its display. “Ne quid nimis let no one quality predominate, and give you, as it were, its nick-name. Think nothing about talking well, except when it is proper to he eloquent; and then think as much as you please about it.
(The following seem to he mere rough fragments or memoranda of passing thoughts, critical and otherwise, jotted down in his habitual manner.)
- M. the Cardinal did not wish to he guessed at.
— + “My mind is full of disquiet.”
“I am full of disquiet” would be better.
— + Eloquence which persuades by gentleness, not by authority. As a tyrant, not a king.
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“The restlessness of his genius two high-sounding words: rather excessive. [These, and several of the preceding half-formed passages, seem to be rough memoranda, intended to be formed into illustrations of the rules of taste in composition which had preceded. (Transl.)]
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Miscell.
XXXVIII. + The doctor, who talks a quarter of an hour after he has said all he had to say, through mere love of hearing his own voice.
- The Paroquet wipes his beak, although it is clean.
— + “Albe vous a nomme: je ne vous connais plus” — Comeille. [Tragedy of Horatii. Act ii., sc. 3]
An inhuman trait. Humanity is the opposite of this.
— + No one calls himself a courtier, but he that is not one; so of a servant, a provincial, &c.; and I would lay a wager that it is the printer who has given that title to the “ Lettres au Provincial XLI. + Carriage, “ versé” or “renversé? according to the intention.
— + “Répandre” or “verser,” according to the intention.
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It is what is perceived at a glance.
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Its principle, that it cannot be otherwise without deformity.
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Founded also on the human figure; whence it is that we see symmetry only in size, not in height nor depth.
XLIII. See remarks in II., IV. and V. of the “Jansenist they are serious and elevated. (Struck through in the MS.)
— + I equally dislike a buffoon and an inflated person.
— + We can make no friend of either one or the other.
— + They consult only the ear, because they have no heart.
— + The rule is, integrity.
— + Poet, and not “honnête homme.”
— + After my 8th, I considered I had replied sufficiently. (Struck through.)
— + Beauty of omission, of judgment.
— + These persons want heart.
— + We can make no friends of them.